I got a degree in sociology, didn't read much fiction in college, and I was a pretty political, left-wing type of guy. I wanted to do some kind of work in social change and make things better for the poor man, and I was very romantic and passionate about it.
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In contrast to oligarchies and totalitarian regimes, democratic societies offer all its citizens the right to participate in public decision making. This description leaves open the question: How can a society accommodate competition or conflict among its members and social groups and yet maintain social cohesion and legitimacy of state authority (Lipset, 1998, One Nation After All. Wilson Quarterly, 22, 100-102)? One answer is that a society can resolve conflicts through democratic processes. But this leads us to ask what conditions allow democratic institutions to form, and once formed, what ensures that they actually function to reduce the inequalities that engender conflict. The broadest test of democratic institutions is not whether they are embodied in formal organizations like legislatures and courts but whether they are able to address the problems of inequality and injustice in the society. There are at least three schools of sociological thought regarding these questions. The first, derived from the functionalist perspective, asserts that democratic political institutions can develop and operate only when certain structural prerequisites, such as a large middle-class, exist in a society. The second school of thought, often referred to as the power elite model, is based on the conflict perspective. It is highly critical of the functionalist view, supporting its criticism with evidence of the ways in which so-called democratic political institutions actually operate to favor the affluent. A third position, known as the pluralist model, asserts that the existence of ruling elites does not mean that a society is undemocratic, as long as there are divisions within the elite and new groups are able to seek power and bargain for policies that favor their interests. Structural Prerequisites of Democracy and the Rule of Law Seymour Martin Lipset (1981, Political Man; 1994, The Social Prerequisites of Democracy Revisited. American Sociological Review, 59, 1-22) argues that democratic political institutions are relatively rare because if they are to exist and function well, the society must have attained a high level of economic and cultural development. To prove his theory, Lipset surveyed data on elections, civil rights, freedom of the press, and party systems in 48 nation-states and subsequently in many other countries (Lipset, 1994). He found that the presence of these institutions was correlated with a nation's level of economic development, its degree of urbanization, the literacy of its citizens, and the degree to which its culture values equality and tolerates descent.
In this cross-cultural research and in his research on democracy in the United States, Lipset attempted to show that the growth of a large middle class is essential to democracy. The middle class population tends to be highly literate and, hence, able to make decisions about complex political and social issues. Moreover, middle-class citizens believe that they have a stake in their society and its political institutions. Accordingly, they often support policies that would reduce the class and status cleavages---the distinctions between the haves and the have-nots---that produce social conflict. Sociologist who studied voting behavior tend to support Lipset's thesis that the stability of democratic institutions rests on structural features that diminish conflict in a society. But their research has revealed something less than complete stability. Maurice Janowitz (1978, The Last Half Century: Societal Change and Politics in America) made this observation, which is even more true today:
The shifts in voting behavior may represent new alignments of voters that could lead to major changes in the nation's public policies. The important point, however, is that these realignments, while they influence which parties and political leaders gain or lose power, do not affect the process of democratic competition itself.
The Power Elite Model However important elections are to the functioning of democratic institutions, there are strong arguments against the idea that they significantly affect the way a society is governed. Some social scientists find, for example, that political decisions are controlled by an elite of rich and powerful individuals (Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 1998, Diversity in the Power Elite). This "power elite" tolerates the formal organizations and procedures of democracy (elections, legislatures, courts, etc.) because it is essentially owns them and can make sure that they act in its interest no matter what the outcome of elections may be. C. Wright Mills, the chief proponent of this point of view, has described the power elite as follows:
When it was first published, Mills's The Power Elite created a stir among sociologists. Mills challenged the assumption that societies that have democratic political institutions are in fact democratic. He asserted instead that party politics and elections are little more than rituals. Power is exercised by a ruling elite of immensely powerful military, business, and political leaders that can put its members into positions of authority whenever it wishes to do so. Mills's claim was significant for another reason as well: Although Mills appreciated Marx's views on the role of class conflict in social change, he did not believe that the working class could win power without joining forces with the middle class. He therefore attempted to demonstrate the existence of a ruling elite to an educated public, which would then, he hoped, be able to see through the rituals of political life and make changes through legitimate means. Other sociologists have questioned the power elite thesis on methodological grounds. For example, Talcott Parsons (1960, Structure and Process in Modern Societies) noted that the power elite was supposed to act behind the scenes rather than publicly. Therefore its actions could not be observed, and the power elite thesis could not be either proved or disproved. The power elite thesis therefore was not scientifically sound, according to Parsons. Numerous adherents of the power elite thesis have attempted to show that a ruling elite does indeed exist and that its activities can be observed. One of the best known of these researchers is Floyd Hunter (1953, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers), whose classic studies of Atlanta's community power structure attempted to show that no more than 40 powerful men were considered to have the ability to make decisions on important issues facing the city and its people. Most of these men were conservative, cost-conscious business leaders. The Hunter study stimulated many attempts to find similar power structures in other cities and in the nation as a whole (Domhoff, 1983, Who Rules America Now? Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 1998). But although the term power structure has found its way into the language of politics, these studies have been strongly criticized for basing their conclusions on what people say about who has power rather than on observations of what people with power actually do (Oppenheimer, [1999, September], We Made It, So What? Monthly Review). The Pluralist Model The power elite thesis has not gone unchallenged. In another famous study of politics---this one in New Haven, Connecticut---Robert Dahl (1961, Who Governs?) found that different individuals played roles in different types of decisions. No single group was responsible for all the decisions that might affect the city's future. No power elite ruled the city, Dahl argued. Instead, several elites interacted in various ways on decisions that affected them. In situations in which the interests of numerous groups were involved, a plurality of decision-makers engaged in a process of coalition-building and bargaining. The pluralist model calls attention to the activities of interest groups at all levels of society (Reidy, 2001, Pluralism, Liberal Democracy, and Compulsory Education. Journal of Social Philosophy, 32, 585-609). Interest groups are not political parties; they are specialized organizations that attempt to influence elected and appointed officials on specific issues. These attempts range from lobbying---the process whereby interest groups seek to persuade legislators to vote in their favor on particular bills---to making contributions to parties and candidates who will support their goals. Trade unions seeking legislation that would limit Imports, organizations for the handicapped seeking regulations that would give them access to public buildings, and ethnic groups seeking to influence U.S. policy toward their country of origin are among the many kinds of interest groups that are active in the United States today (Oberschall, 1996, Social Movements).
In recent decades, as the number of organized interest groups has grown, so has the complexity of the bargaining that takes place between them and the officials they want to influence. Social scientists who study politics from the pluralist perspective frequently wonder whether the activities of these groups threaten the ability of elected officials to govern effectively. Thus a study of a federal economic development project in Oakland, California, found that the personnel in the agency responsible for such projects had to learn to deal with supporting and opposing interest group leaders and elected officials throughout the life of the project. It took six years of constant negotiation on many unanticipated issues---affirmative action and employment, environmental concerns, design specifications---before a firm could win a contract to build an airplane hangar (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, Implementation, 3rd ed.). *MAIN SOURCE: KORNBLUM, W., (2003), SOCIOLOGY IN A CHANGING WORLD, 6TH ED., PP. 626-628* end |
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